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Abstract
The aim of this research is to investigate the impact of energy sector reforms on 
electricity generation and thus economic growth in EU and Southeast European 
countries. The paper aims at clarifying whether the impact of energy sector 
reforms on generation efficiency differs among countries according to their level 
of development and regional characteristics. Our hypothesis is that the EU reform 
model is not appropriate for all Member States and Southeast European countries 
since it does not improve efficiency in electricity generation in all countries and 
therefore, it can hamper economic growth. For testing the defined hypothesis the 
panel regression model with fixed effects has been used. The research results show 
that unlike in the EU-15 (old Member States), energy sector reforms in the EU-12 
(new Member States), and selected Southeast European countries (Energy 
Community contracting parties) have no significant impact on electricity 
transmission and distribution losses. These evidences imply that the uniform EU 
reform model does not improve efficiency of electricity generation in less developed 
countries. On the contrary it can even hamper economic growth and therefore it 
cannot be appropriate for all Member States. The reason lies in the fact that 
successful reform model requires adequate level of institutional resources that are 
missing in most transition and post-transition countries.
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1. Introduction
Long term, sustainable economic growth needs a sustainable electricity supply. In 
order to accomplish this goal, good economic governance incorporating energy 
policy should implement reforms that will increase economic efficiency and social 
prosperity. 2015 has been a turbulent year for the energy sector – geopolitical 
uncertainties, slowing economic growth and the drop in oil prices are affecting 
electricity sectors around the world. In this context, effective energy reforms are 
more important than ever to drive competitiveness and economic growth. EU as the 
major energy importer and Southeast European countries that have become Energy 
Community contracting parties face some of the greatest challenges in transforming 
its electricity sector. 
Improvement in efficiency constitutes one of the main aims in any electricity 
sector reform program. It is typically argued that, even in the short run, the reform 
process introduces competition, which in turn encourages economic units with the 
lowest costs to operate in the market. Overall, it is expected that the introduction of 
reforms in the electricity sector leads to higher efficiency levels and thus stimulates 
economic growth. There is a growing body of literature that proved a strong 
evidence on correlation and causal relationship between electricity production and 
economic growth in developed and developing countries (Morimoto and Hope 
(2004); Yoo and Kim (2006); Ghosh (2009); Lean and Smyth (2010); Sarker and 
Alam (2010); Bayraktutan et al. (2011); Zeshan (2013)). Therefore it will not be 
a subject of research in this paper. However, analyzing the impact of reforms on 
the most important segment of electricity sector – electricity generation, one could 
estimate the impact of the reforms on economic growth. A reform process is a set 
of multidimensional activities with interacting factors and impacts. At one level, 
reform measures involve structural and organizational changes in the energy sector, 
while at another, broader, level they aim to establish the appropriate institutional 
setting such as legislation and new regulatory agencies. Although there are 
differences in individual reforms across the world, the EU Member States have 
implemented the same reform model. Generally, it involves a combination of key 
elements: 1) regulatory reforms and the establishment of an independent regulatory 
authority, 2) restructuring (vertical and horizontal unbundling), 3) market 
liberalization (competition on the wholesale and retail market) and 4) privatization 
(new entries by private firms and privatization of state companies). 
The reforms in the sector started in the early 1990s, which has limited the existing 
literature due to the relatively short span of time, especially in econometric studies 
that require a large number of observations. Moreover, the literature lacks adequate 
cross-testing of most of the hypotheses and lacks data conducting appropriate 
panel-data analysis. Though there are a number of papers dealing with the results of 
the reforms in developed countries using cross-country models, the number of those 
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focusing on transition and developing economies is rather small, especially those 
using panel data analysis. Therefore, there is a strong need for a new systematic 
analysis that would include the EU countries and the Southeast European countries 
in addition to a broader range of issues related to energy sector reforms within a 
longer time frame. As far as is known, this is the first analysis in the field performed 
on Southeast European countries.
The aim of this research is to investigate the effects of the reforms conducted in 
the energy sector on electricity generation and its efficiency measured by installed 
electricity generation capacity and network (transmission and distribution) losses, 
in order to predict the growth potential of the reforms. Since the research intends 
to prove that the EU reform model cannot be appropriate for all Member States and 
Southeast European countries as Energy Community contracting parties, the paper 
aims at clarifying whether the impact of the energy sector reform on generation 
efficiency differs among countries according to their level of development and 
regional characteristics. Empirical econometric models are estimated and then 
analyzed to observe the effects of the energy market reforms on electricity 
generation and electricity network losses. The data used in our analysis is net 
electricity generation per capita (in GWh/million people), net installed electricity 
generation capacity per capita (in GW/million people), net electricity generation 
per employee (in GWh/million people) and electricity network (transmission 
and distribution) losses (% of output) as dependent variables. The explanatory 
(independent) variable is the ‘electricity market reform’ variable computed in 
accordance with methodology developed by Erdogdu (2011) that covers the key 
elements of reforms. Our hypothesis is that the EU reform model is not appropriate 
for all Member States and Southeast European countries that are Energy 
Community contracting parties since it does not improve efficiency in electricity 
generation in all countries and therefore it can even hamper economic growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a literature review on economic 
effects of reforms conducted in the energy sector with special reference to electricity 
sector. Section 3 describes the econometric methodology, Section 4 describes data 
and presents the obtained empirical results. Section 5 discusses the results and the 
final section contains the conclusions.
2. Literature review
Owing to the fact that the electricity sector operates within the wider economic 
and institutional system, it can be expected that the reform results are strongly 
influenced by overall macroeconomic framework and vice versa, reform results 
have considerable impact on economic growth. Institutional aspects of the sector 
such is regulatory regime also affects the dynamics and the results of reforms and 
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consequently economic growth. Broadly, the findings of the literature on electricity 
reforms and their impact on economic efficiency and growth may be summarized 
in several fields regarding the impacts of particular reform measures on economic 
outcomes.
Effects of competition and market liberalization have been the research interest in 
many papers. According to Zhang et al. (2002), competition leads to higher output, 
capacity and labor productivity in developing countries. However, they also found 
that competition has no statistically significant impact on electricity price ratio 
between industrial and residential consumers in developing countries. Steiner 
(2001) found that unbundling of generation and transmission in developed countries 
results in higher capacity utilization rates and lower reserve margins. Moreover, 
according to her study, unbundling does not lead to lower electricity prices but is 
positively correlated with cost-reflective pricing. Hattori and Tsutsui (2003) found 
that ‘legal unbundling’ leads to higher electricity prices, and that the introduction of 
wholesale power pool is associated with higher electricity prices. 
The question of energy sector reforms’ impact on electricity prices has been widely 
analysed because of its important effect on economic welfare. Thomas (2006) 
rejects the widespread beliefs that energy market reforms and liberalization in 
the European Union result in lower electricity prices for consumers. According 
to Thomas, price reductions occurred mostly in the period 1995-2000 before 
liberalization was effective in most of the EU countries. These price reductions 
were mostly the result of fossil fuel price movements, relatively low costs, changes 
in regulatory practices and technological innovations. After 2000, electricity prices 
have risen sharply both for residential and industrial consumers in the European 
Union. Furthermore, he suggests that the EU reform model’s real test is whether 
it can deliver timely investment to meet the emerging investment gap following 
the elimination of short run inefficiency and initially high reserve margins (Pollitt 
2007). Using a panel data for the EU-15 countries over the period 1978-2005, 
Fiorio et al. (2007) investigate the impact of electricity market reform on household 
electricity prices. According to their results, entry and vertical integration do not 
seem to lower electricity prices, while public ownership leads to lower electricity 
prices. Using a panel data for 83 countries covering the period 1985-2002, 
Nagayama (2007) tries to answer if and how individual reforms steps impact 
electricity prices for countries in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and 
Latin America. Their research findings also suggest that the introduction of a 
wholesale spot market and unbundling of generation and transmission do not 
lead to a reduction in electricity prices. Contrary to their expectations, these two 
individual reforms steps resulted in an increase of electricity prices. In addition, 
Nagayama found that the introduction of foreign independent power producers 
(IPP), competition in electricity retail markets and privatization have led to a 
reduction in electricity prices in some, but not in all of the regions. In his second 
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paper, Nagayama (2009) wants to clarify whether the effects of energy sector 
reforms are systematically different among various country groups in relation to 
level of development and region. Nagayama observed the impact of electricity 
prices on the implementation of a liberalization model. In this study, a panel data 
from 78 countries in four regions is used for the period 1985-2003. The four 
regions include: developed countries, Latin America, Asian developing countries, 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. According to research findings, 
higher electricity prices have a significant impact on government decision 
to adopt liberalization models. The research findings again suggest that the 
development of liberalization models in the electricity sector is not necessarily 
associated with lower electricity prices. Quite on the contrary, electricity prices 
have risen in every market model. 
Another research field is oriented towards the effects of regulation. An effective 
regulatory system is crucial for both investor confidence and consumer protection. 
A well-designed regulatory system should protect consumers from monopoly abuse 
and provide investors with protection from arbitrary political action. In addition, 
one of the main aims of a well-designed regulatory system is to provide investors 
with incentives to promote efficient operation and investments (Laffont and 
Tirole 1993). According to Parker at.al. (2007), effective regulation achieves the 
social welfare goals set down by the government for the regulatory authority. In 
developing countries, the social welfare objectives of regulation are likely to be not 
simply concerned with the pursuit of economic efficiency but with wider goals to 
promote sustainable development and poverty reduction. They tested the hypothesis 
that the efficiency and quality of regulation affects the economic performance of 
an economy and conclude that the impact of regulatory institutions on economic 
growth will depend on both the efficiency of the regulatory policies and instruments 
that are used and the quality of the governance processes that are practised by the 
regulatory authorities. Under risky regulatory conditions, private operators will be 
unwilling to invest and will produce less (Gupta and Sravat 1998; Holburn 2001) 
and consequently it will lower economic growth. At the same time, clearly stated 
regulatory rules within a well-defined regulatory framework can be expected to 
reduce ‘regulatory risk’ and provide incentives for private investment which is the 
main objective when independent regulatory bodies are established (Zhang et al., 
2008). Therefore, a carefully designed regulation can be seen as a key component of 
a successful reform that would stimulate economic activity and welfare. Although 
the attitude of economic theory towards a positive impact of regulatory quality on 
the success of the electricity sector is clear, there are only a few empirical studies 
dealing with this issue focusing electricity sector and they are mainly focused on 
the efficiency of electricity generation, and not the sector as a whole. The lack of 
empirical, quantitative research of this issue is mostly the result of difficulties in 
quantifying regulatory quality parameters. However, there are several papers that 
have identified the causal effects of better governance and overall institutional 
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design on higher per capita incomes in the long run (Barro, 1997; Hall and Jones, 
1999; Kauffman and Kraay, 2002). Olson et al. (1998) find that productivity growth 
is higher in countries with better institutions and quality of governance. Kauffman 
and Kraay (2002) relate the quality of governance to economic outcomes using a 
data set covering 175 countries for the period 2000-01. 
The effects of privatization on economic performance and economic growth 
have been investigated in many papers but their conclusions are ambiguous. 
Bortolotti et al. (1998) conclude that effective regulation is crucial to the 
success of privatization and its impact on economic growth. They use data on 
the privatization of electricity generation in 38 countries (both developed 
and developing) between 1977 and 1997. Using a panel dataset of 19 OECD 
countries for the period 1987-1996, Steiner (2001) tests the impact of regulatory 
environment, the degree of vertical integration and the degree of private 
ownership on electricity prices and overall efficiency. The four main variables 
in her panel data analysis are: electricity price per unit, industrial to residential 
electricity price ratio, generation capacity utilization ratio and generation reserve 
margin. The first two variables represent the competitive aspects of reform, 
while the second two examine the reform’s cost efficiency. Some elements of 
the electricity sector reform are tested separately in this study: the introduction 
of a wholesale power pool, unbundling of transmission system operator, third 
party access to transmission grid and privatization. The results of the study show 
that privatization leads to higher electricity prices and industrial to residential 
electricity price ratio. Moreover, privatization has no significant impact on cost 
efficiency. According to Steiner, there is a significantly positive relationship 
between the utilization rate on one hand, and private ownership and unbundling of 
generation and transmission on the other. Steiner also concludes that privatization 
leads to higher operating efficiency and capital utilization in developed countries. 
Using a similar analysis, but over a longer period of time, 1987-1999, Hattori 
and Tsutsui (2004) test the impact of unbundling of transmission from generation, 
third party access, the existence of a wholesale market and privatization on 
electricity prices. They detect that privatization leads to lower electricity prices 
for industrial consumers. Using a fixed effects panel data model for 25 developing 
countries covering the period 1985-2001, Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2002) 
investigate the effects of privatization, competition and regulation reforms 
on electricity generation. They also test combined effects of regulation and 
competition and effects of regulation and privatization on electricity generation. 
The results of the study show that privatization per se is not associated with 
higher operating efficiency in terms of labor productivity. However, privatization 
leads to better capacity utilization. When there is a supportive independent 
regulatory authority in place, privatization will lead to higher output and thus 
stimulate economic growth. However, the effects of privatization on electricity 
prices are insignificant. 
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A research by Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2008) about the effects of 
privatization, regulation and competition on efficiency in electricity generation 
activity, conducted on a sample of 36 transition and developing countries, came to 
similar conclusions. According to their results, regulatory reforms on their own are 
not sufficient to increase electricity generation. Moreover, if they are not conducted 
at the same time as other reforms, primarily unbundling and market liberalization, 
they can even worsen the performances of electricity generation companies. 
Therefore, regulatory quality is important, but has to be accompanied by other 
reforms. Furthermore, it demands independence and transparency of the regulatory 
body. They proved that competition and not privatization is a crucial element for 
efficiency improvement in the sector having a significant monopolistic/oligopolistic 
market structure. The data also shows that privatization is beneficial for growth 
only when it is followed by a quality regulation framework and existence of an 
independent regulator. Their main conclusion is that privatization and regulation on 
their own do not lead to improvements in economic performances and economic 
growth, even though there are some positive interactive effects. However, 
introducing competition is very efficient in stimulating improvements of economic 
performances. 
Jamasb et al. (2004) analyzed a large number of studies looking at electricity market 
reforms in developing countries. These studies cover a wider range of variables than 
those tested in the EU-focused studies and address additional issues such as the role 
of wider institutional arrangements (outside the electricity sector), energy resource 
endowments (whether self-sufficiency encourages reform), the impact of reform 
on investments and energy losses and the role of privatization and independent 
regulation (Pollitt, 2007). Jamasb et al. (2004) summarize the econometric evidence 
contained in Wolak (1997), Zellner and Henisz (2000), Bacon and Besant-Jones 
(2001), Drillisch and Riechmann (1998), Holburn (2001), Siniscalo et al. (2001), 
Ruffin (2003), Bergara et al. (1997) and Zhang et al. (2002). (see Pollitt, 2007). 
According to Pollitt (2007), their main conclusions are: 
1. Political and judicial institutions and energy resource endowments matter for 
reform progress, which means that wider economic, institutional and political 
environment is important.
2. Privatization improves efficiency if accompanied by independent regulation. 
Competition improves efficiency in generation, but independent regulator alone 
is not significant for efficiency and economic outcomes.
3. Privatization has no significant effect on prices; competition has a mixed effect, 
while regulation has no significant price effect.
4. Private investment that is beneficial for economic growth is stimulated by 
the strength of property rights protection and the presence of independent 
regulation.
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It should be noted that there has been limited cross-testing of most of the hypotheses 
across the studies, so further analysis is necessary to increase the reliability of the 
results. According to Jamasb et al. (2005), there is reason to question the robustness 
of some of the empirical findings as the comparability of the studies is constrained 
by variations in data and model specifications. It is hard to get a consistent 
picture of reform due to obstacles in comparability between different studies 
that use different data and methods. Even where there is a rather high degree of 
comparability, sensitivity of the findings to the choice and definition of variables 
and model specification, casts considerable uncertainty over the policy relevance of 
the existing body of knowledge.
3. Methodology of analysis 
The methodology used in our research is based on panel data. Panel data has two 
dimensions: cross-sectional dimension representing individual country and time 
dimension (Wooldridge, 2003). According to Gujarati (2004) panel data sets take 
into account the heterogeneity in the cross-sectional units, give more informative 
data, less co-linearity among variables, more variability, more degrees of freedom 
and more efficiency. Panel data sets help to study the dynamics of change as it 
helps to study repeated cross-section of observations and therefore they are used 
to analyze the effects that cannot be observed in pure cross-section or pure time-
series data. These data sets minimize the bias that may result if individual units are 
aggregated into broad aggregates. In addition, the use of panel data also provides a 
means of reducing the problem caused by the omission of certain variables that are 
correlated with explanatory variables (Hsiao, 1999).
In this study the panel regression model with fixed effects was used. The fixed-
effects model is a common choice among economists in cases when the model is 
evaluated based on the data which are not randomly chosen and where there is a 
high probability that each country has certain specific effects in correlation with 
regressors. As we are dealing with different country samples (developed and 
developing countries) and bigger time series, country and time effects should be 
included in the model. They should be included in form of a fixed-effects model 
when the focus is set on specific set of countries. On the other hand, a panel 
regression model with random effects is used when individual countries are chosen 
from a larger population (Jamasb et al. 2005).
The panel data consists of N-units and T-time periods, and therefore we have N 
times T observations. The classical linear regression model without the intercept is:
Yit = β1Xit1 + β2Xit2 + μit  (1)
for i = 1, 2, …, N and t = 1, 2, …, T
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where Yit is the value of Y for the ith unit for the tth time period; Xit1 is the value of 
X1 for the ith unit for the tth time period; Xit2 is the value of X2 for the ith unit for the 
tth time period, and μit is the error for the ith unit for the tth time period. 
The fixed-effects regression model, which is an extension of the classical linear 
regression model, is: 
Yit = β1Xit1 + β2Xit2 + νi + εit   (2)
where μit = νi + εit. We have decomposed the error term for the classical linear 
regression model into two components. The component νi represents all unobserved 
factors that vary across units but are constant over time. The component εit 
represents all unobserved factors that vary across units and time. We assume that 
the net effect on Y of unobservable factors for the ith unit that are constant over 
time is a fixed parameter, designated αi. The fixed-effects parameters, αi, capture 
the net effects of all variables, both observable and unobservable, that differ across 
units but are constant over time. Therefore, in the fixed-effects model we cannot 
include any observable variable that differs across units but is constant over time. If 
we do, then we have perfect multicollinearity and we cannot obtain estimates of the 
parameters.
We formulate regression equations as below in order to analyze the impact of 
electricity industry reform on power sector efficiency:
Yit = β1 + Σ βjXjit + Σγp Zpi + δt + εit (3)
where i and t represent unit of observation and time period, respectively; j and p are 
indices used to differentiate between observed and unobserved variables; Xji and 
Zpi represent observed and unobserved variables, respectively; Xji includes both 
reform variable and control variable; Yit is dependent variable; εit is the disturbance 
term and t is time trend term. It is impossible to obtaining information about the 
ΣγpZpi because the Zpi variables are unobserved. We define a term αi, known as 
the unobserved effect, which represents the joint impact of the Zpi variables on Yit. 
Therefore our model can be written as follows:
Yit = β1 + Σ βjXjit + αi + δt + εit (4)
According to Erdogdu (2011), the characterization of the αi component is crucially 
important in the analysis. “If control variables are so comprehensive that they 
capture all relevant characteristics of the individual, there will be no relevant 
unobserved characteristics. In that case, the αi term may be dropped and pooled 
data regression (OLS) may be used to fit the model, treating all the observations for 
all time periods as a single sample” (Erdogdu, 2011). Since we are not sure whether 
control variables in our models describe all relevant country characteristics, we 
cannot directly carry out a pooled data regression of Y on X because it would 
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generate an omitted variable bias. In order to choose between two regression 
specifications, we apply the Hausmann test for fixed versus random effects. First, 
we estimate the fixed effects model (which is consistent) and then estimate the 
random-effects model (which is efficient). On a significance level of 5%, Hausmann 
test indicates significant differences in the coefficients, so we decide to use fixed 
effects model. 
4. Data and empirical analysis
The data used in our analysis is net electricity generation per capita (in GWh/
million people), net installed electricity generation capacity per capita (in GW/
million people), net electricity generation per employee (in GWh/million people) 
and electricity transmission and distribution losses (% of output) as dependent 
variables. These four indicators represent the efficiency in electricity sector. 
According to Nepal and Jamasb (2012), per capita approximation is used in order to 
homogenize the effect of increasing population across all outcomes.
Net electricity generation per capita represents the first indicator of efficiency 
in electricity sector. This variable is calculated by dividing the net electricity 
generation by the total number of population in each country and each year. The 
data on net electricity generation and population are obtained by US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA, 2012) and World Bank (2012).
Net installed electricity generation capacity per capita represents the second 
indicator of efficiency in electricity sector. This measure is reflective of the 
capital investments devoted to electricity generation and expansion capacity. The 
variable is calculated by dividing the net installed electricity generation capacity 
by the total number of population in each country and each year. The data on net 
installed electricity generation capacity and population are obtained by US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA, 2012) and World Bank (2012).
The third indicator of efficiency in electricity sector is net electricity generation per 
employee in electricity sector. This indicator represents the labour productivity in 
electricity sector that comprises generation, transmission, distribution and supply 
of electricity. A higher net electricity generation per employee will lead to more 
efficient electricity sector. This variable is calculated by dividing the net electricity 
generation by the number of people employed in electricity sector. The data on net 
electricity generation are obtained by US Energy Information Administration (US 
EIA, 2012). The data on employment in electricity sector come from EU KLEMS 
database (2012).
Electricity transmission and distribution losses (% of output) represent the last 
efficiency indicator in our analysis. Electricity transmission and distribution losses 
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are network losses and include losses in transmission between sources of supply 
and points of distribution and in the distribution to consumers (US IEA, 2012). Any 
decrease in electricity transmission and distribution losses (% of output) will lead 
to higher efficiency in electricity sector. The data on electricity transmission and 
distribution losses (% of output) are obtained from the World Bank (2012).
Since our aim is to analyse the impact of electricity sector reforms on efficiency 
in electricity sector, we decided to construct explanatory (independent) variable 
by using the same methodology as Erdogdu (2011) and apply for a different group 
of countries. In order to construct the „electricity market reform“ variable which 
covers all key elements of reforms in electricity sector, we created 8 dummy 
variables that can take on the values from 0 to 8, depending on the number of reform 
steps taken in each country and each year. Although there exist a wide variability 
in individual electricity sector reforms, they basically include the combination 
of these key elements of reforms (IADB, 2001; Joskow, 1998; Newberry, 2002): 
(1) introduction of independent power producers, (2) corporatization of state-
owned enterprises, (3) law for electricity sector liberalisation, (4) introduction of 
unbundling, (5) establishment of an electricity market regulator, (6) introduction 
of privatization, (7) establishment of a wholesale electricity market and (8) choice 
of supplier. The dummy variables for reform steps were created by the authors 
based on the collected data from various international and national sources: OECD 
International Regulation Database (2015), Council of European Energy Regulators 
(2005; 2005a; 2005b), Energy Community Secretariat (2007; 2012; 2013; 2014), 
European Commission (2001; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2005a; 2009; 2010; 2011), Poyry 
and Nord Pool Consulting AS (2010) and Regional Centre for Energy Policy 
Research (2009). 
We also tested the possible interactional effects of individual reform steps in 
electricity sector on electricity generation and electricity network losses. The 
following interactional variables are included in the model: (1) privatization and 
regulatory Agency; (2) privatization and unbundling and (3).regulatory agency and 
unbundling. 
GDP per capita variable is used as a control variable and it represents a part of 
the country specific features that may have an influence on efficiency level in the 
electricity industry. Data on GDP per capita come from the World Bank (2012).
Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics, and normality test for level and first 
differenced variables. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables in Model 1 (for EU-15)





generation per capita 7.091135 .6910852 5.328518 9.592696 240
Net installed generation 
capacity per capita 1.938428 .1784281 1.444962 2.553249 240
Net electricity 
generation per 
employee in electricity 
sector
4.037382 .826799 .7015252 6.537857 240
Share of transmission 
and distribution 
electricity losses in 
output (%)
6.572456 3.008035 1,1531681 39,07103825 240
Explanatory Variables
Electricity market 
reform score 5.379167 2.631033 -.0583333 9.129167 240
Privatization and
Regulator .4791667 .3937934 -.3958333 1.166667 240
Privatization and 
Unbundling .4625 .4010316 -.4125 1.15 240
Unbundling and 
Regulator .6458333 .4419787 -.2291667 1.270833 240
GDP per capita 10.30838 .2829249 9.696869 10.87589 240
Source: Authors
The dataset covered in the analysis includes a sample of all EU Member States 
in which the electricity market reform process has been initiated. The economic 
effects of the electricity sector reforms on electricity generation and electricity 
transmission and distribution losses are analyzed for two groups of countries: 
the EU-15 (old EU Member States) and the EU-12 (new EU Member States) and 
selected Southeast European countries.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables in Model 1 (for EU-12 and selected 
SEE countries)





generation per capita 4.139673 .464603 2.817977 6.459713 208
Net installed generation 
capacity per capita 1.044113 .1692366 .5099791 1.892792 208
Net electricity 
generation per 
employee in electricity 
sector
1.296591 .3086592 .1557117 2.448997 208
Share of transmission 
and distribution 
electricity losses in 
output (%)
12.88576 5.057353 3,012997243 72,9020979 208
Explanatory Variables
Electricity market 
reform score 4.230769 2.201651 -1.615385 7.615385 208
Privatization and 
Regulator .3605769 .3437611 -.5625 1.206731 208
Privatization and 
Unbundling .3125 .3806935 -.3798077 1.158654 208
Unbundling and 
Regulator .5240385 .4471305 -.2451923 1.139423 208
Control Variables
GDP per capita 8.78551 .4746093 7.880023 9.742519 208
Source: Authors
The data set for the EU-15 countries is based on a panel of the following 15 
countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, Greece and United Kingdom. The 
EU-12 countries include: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. The selected 
SEE countries included in the model are: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR 
Macedonia and Albania. Due to the lack of data for the period 1998-2005, Serbia 
and Montenegro are not included (Montenegro became independent from Serbia 
in 2006). The data set for the EU-12 and selected SEE is based on a panel of 16 
countries. In total our data set is based on a panel of 31 countries.
The time period used in the analysis is 1995 – 2010 for the EU-15 countries and 
1998 – 2010, due to the unavailability of data, for the EU-12 and selected SEE 
countries. 
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We are aware that the analysis would be far more robust if a longer time span was 
available, especially for Southeast European countries, but this was impossible 
due to the lack of the data on electricity sector reforms. Generally, data availability 
shapes the content and manner of addressing research questions. Another common 
difficulty is how to represent qualitative aspects of reform such as institutional 
factors or market structure characteristics. Since these aspects are difficult to define 
and measure directly and objectively, a common approach has been to use proxies 
in the form of indices and categorical variables (Jamasb et al., 2005). 
As it has been mentioned, the analysis has been done for the EU-15 and the EU-12 
and selected Southeast European countries. The research results for the EU-15 are 
presented in Table 3.
Table 3:  The impact of energy sector reforms on electricity generation and electricity 












































































Observations 240 240 240 240
R2 0.28 0.54 0.51 0.17
Note: Coefficient is significant at the ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level
Source: Authors’ calculations
The research results show that energy market reforms in the EU-15 (electricity 
market reform variable) have a significantly positive impact on net electricity 
generation per capita, net installed electricity generation capacity per capita 
and net electricity generation per employee in the electricity sector. Moreover, 
energy market reforms in the EU-15 have a significant impact on the reduction of 
electricity transmission and distribution losses.
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The interaction variable ‘privatization and regulator’ has a significantly positive 
impact on net electricity generation per capita, net installed electricity generation 
capacity per capita as well as on the reduction of transmission and distribution losses.
However, the interaction variable ‘privatization and unbundling’ has a significantly 
negative impact on net installed electricity generation capacity per capita and a 
significant impact on the increase of transmission and distribution losses. Similarly, 
the interaction variable ‘unbundling and regulator’ has also a significantly negative 
impact on net installed electricity generation capacity per capita and a significant 
impact on the increase of transmission and distribution losses.
In line with our expectations, GDP per capita has a significantly positive impact on net 
electricity generation per capita, net installed electricity generation capacity per capita 
and net electricity generation per employee in the electricity sector and it also has a 
significant impact on the reduction of electricity transmission and distribution losses.
Table 4 presents the empirical results for the EU-12 and selected Southeast European 
countries.
Table 4:  The impact of energy sector reforms on electricity generation and 
electricity transmission and distribution losses in the EU-12 and selected 












































































Observations 240 240 240 240
R2 0.315 0.121 0.481 0.054
Note: Coefficient is significant at the ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculation
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Although energy sector reforms in the EU-12 and other selected countries in 
Southeast Europe (‘electricity market reform’ variable) have a significantly positive 
impact on net electricity generation per capita, net installed electricity generation 
capacity per capita and net electricity generation per employee in the electricity 
sector, the reforms results are not positive regarding electricity transmission and 
distribution losses. GDP per capita, as a control variable, has a significantly positive 
impact on net electricity generation per employee in the electricity sector.
5. Results and discussion
The obtained results show that the unbundling of electricity activities in interaction 
with privatization and regulatory agency is not necessarily associated with the 
increase in electricity generation efficiency. On the other hand, the unbundling of 
electricity activities in interaction with privatization and the regulatory agency may 
have a negative impact on efficiency indicators in electricity generation. As we have 
expected, the research results show that there are important differences between old 
Member States on one hand (EU-15) and new EU Member States and Southeast 
European countries on the other. According to our results, in less developed 
countries the unbundling in interaction with privatization and the regulatory agency 
increase the level of electricity transmission and distribution losses. Although the 
unbundling of activities in energy sector is the necessary step in reform process 
of all EU Member States, it seems that it could have negative consequences for 
industry efficiency in case of small and less developed energy systems. Several 
factors are in favor of the integration of electricity segments. First, a common 
ownership of electricity activities enables minimization of costs far more than when 
these are unbundled. Secondly, vertically integrated generation and transmission 
simplify the link between the investments in electricity generation capacities and 
the return on invested assets. It is worth mentioning that the investments in the 
electricity sector are specific, as there is a high level of uncertainty of asset return. 
This is the case with narrowly specialized investments where there is almost no 
possibility of changing their purpose. Consequently, the investors are interested to 
invest only if their investment is secured, either in form of a long-term delivery 
arrangement or unique company model. In the case of electricity generation and 
distribution there are two additional factors in favor of integration: investment 
planning and urgent interventions in electricity supply for consumers. 
Since unbundling of the system tends to increase transaction costs and loss of 
economies of coordination, the net effect is uncertain in the absence of independent 
regulatory oversight. The effectiveness of competition and incentive regulation will 
determine whether the benefits of the reform will exceed the higher transaction 
costs in order to produce net performance improvements (Jamasb et al., 2005). The 
reason lies in the fact that economic and political institutions which are necessary 
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for a proper functioning of the regulatory bodies are still underdeveloped in most 
transition countries. It seems that reforms per se cannot improve structural problems 
without stabile and incentive macroeconomic environment and institutional 
framework. Regulatory agencies are also faced with the lack of qualified 
human, administrative and know-how resources. Their complete independence 
is questionable as the government still has a formal or informal impact on them, 
particularly in those activities that are related to electricity prices. Another issue is 
the informal influence of the regulated industry, in regards to the high concentration 
of staff coming from the electricity industry, which put regulators in a bad position. 
Therefore, the regulation can even lose its initial purpose and instead of protecting 
the consumers, it starts protecting the regulated industry. 
Negative results of energy sector reforms in less developed countries (EU-12 and 
selected Southeast European countries) are also related to specific problems in 
those economies: economic losses due to financial indiscipline and inadequate 
collection of bills, especially in Southeast European countries, and technical losses 
as a consequence of old technology, especially in distribution networks. 
Based on the obtained results, it can be concluded that the reform processes in 
energy sector that encompasses regulatory reforms, restructuring, liberalization and 
privatization has been far more difficult for transition countries than for developed 
old EU Member States. It is a consequence of the fact that their electricity systems 
entered the reform process with a significantly negative heritage and have been 
faced with macroeconomic and institutional constraints. Since the impact of these 
reform steps on electricity generation and transmission and distribution losses is 
negative, it implies that the uniform EU reform energy model cannot be incentive 
for economic activity in all countries and can even hamper their economic growth. 
Therefore it is reasonable to question the uniform EU reform model because it 
is obviously not appropriate for all countries since it requires adequate level of 
institutional resources that are missing in most transition and some post-transition 
countries.
6. Conclusion
The results of the research show that the hypothesis has proved to be true. The 
findings show that unlike in the EU-15 countries, energy sector reforms in the 
EU-12 and selected Southeast European countries have no significant impact on 
electricity transmission and distribution losses. Even more, when the interaction 
variables were applied, the results show that the unbundling of electricity activities 
in interaction with privatization and regulatory agencies have a negative impact on 
efficiency indicators in electricity generation and even increase transmission and 
distribution losses. Although a positive correlation between electricity generation 
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and economic growth has been proved in many studies, nevertheless one could 
conclude that energy sector reforms have not been beneficial for economic activity 
and GDP growth in transition and post-transition economies. It could mean that the 
EU reform model in energy sector is not appropriate for all Member States because 
it requires appropriate level of institutional resources in order to benefit from it. Of 
course the obtained results do the certain contribution to the economic literature. 
However, we are aware of some limitations of this research that we acknowledge. 
Like all other econometric studies on electricity reform, the issue of endogeniety 
may be raised in our study too. It is likely that just as reform process has an effect 
on electricity generation efficiency indicators, electricity generation can also affect 
reform decisions. Another limitation is the short time period available for EU-12 
and Southeast European countries and questionable quality of data in the early 
’90. In the future it may be interesting to investigate the relationship between 
industrial characteristics and reform results in electricity sector because, contrary 
to the theory, countries with highly developed industrial sector are not prone to 
conduct unbundling and liberalization. Despite these limitations this is, as far as is 
known, the first systematic analysis of energy reform results in transition countries 
of Southeast Europe in a wider European framework. The results we obtained 
could have important consequences for economic and energy policy in light of the 
ongoing desire to increase electricity generation, improve efficiency and stimulate 
economic growth. Policy makers should implement such a reform model that would 
boost energy production and its efficiency and enhance sustainable economic 
growth that would be based on domestic rather than imported energy.
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Potencijalni učinak reformi u energetskom sektoru na ekonomski rast: 
Novi dokazi o proizvodnji električne energije u EU i zemljama jugoistočne 
Europe1 
Nela Vlahinić Lenz2, Vedran Prša3
Sažetak
Cilj ovog rada je istražiti učinak reformi u energetskom sektoru na proizvodnju 
električne energije, a time i na ekonomski rast u zemljama EU i jugoistočne 
Europe. Rad želi pojasniti postoje li razlike u učincima reformi na proizvodnu 
efikasnost po zemljama s obzirom na dostignuti stupanj razvoja i regionalne 
karakteristike. Naša je hipoteza da EU reformski model nije odgovarajući za sve 
zemlje članice EU i zemlje jugoistočne Europe jer ne povećava efikasnost 
proizvodnje u svim zemljama te stoga može ugroziti ekonomski rast. Za testiranje 
navedene hipoteze koristi se panel regresijski model s fiksnim učincima. Rezultati 
istraživanja pokazuju da za razliku od EU-15 (stare zemlje članice), reforme u 
energetskom sektoru u EU-12 (nove zemlje članice) i izabranim zemljama 
jugoistočne Europe (ugovorne strane Energetske Zajednice) nemaju signifikantan 
učinak na gubitke u prijenosnoj i distribucijskoj mreži. Ovi rezultati upućuju na 
zaključak da jedinstveni EU reformski model nužno ne unapređuje efikasnost u 
djelatnosti proizvodnje električne energije u manje razvijenim zemljama. Čak 
štoviše, može ugroziti ekonomski rast te stoga ne može biti prihvatljiv u svim 
zemljama članicama. Razlog leži u činjenici da uspješan model reformi zahtijeva 
odgovarajuću razinu institucionalnih resursa koji još uvijek nisu zadovoljavajući u 
većini tranzicijskih i post-tranzicijskih zemalja. 
Ključne riječi: reforme u energetskom sektoru, proizvodnja električne energije, 
ekonomski rast, gubitci u prijenosu i distribuciji, EU, jugoistočna Europa
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